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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have tremendous
potential in advancing the vision for self-driving cars. However,
the security of DNN models in this context leads to major safety
implications and needs to be better understood. We consider the
case study of steering angle prediction from camera images, using
the dataset from the 2014 Udacity challenge. We demonstrate for
the first time adversarial testing-time attacks for this application
for both classification and regression settings. We show that minor
modifications to the camera image (an L2 distance of 0.82 for one
of the considered models) result in mis-classification of an image
to any class of attacker’s choice. Furthermore, our regression
attack results in a significant increase in Mean Square Error
(MSE) – by a factor of 69 in the worst case.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in Machine Learning (ML) and Deep Neural Net-
works (DNNs) bring tremendous potential to make autonomous
vehicles a reality. In this setting, sensors such as camera,
light detection and ranging sensor (LiDAR), and Infrared (IR)
generate streams of real-time data. Envisioned ML applications
include: predicting road conditions by interacting with other
cars; recognizing risky road conditions; and assisting drivers in
taking safer decisions. For this highly-critical application, safety
is the major concern, but unfortunately ML algorithms are not
traditionally designed and evaluated from this perspective.
At the same time, the security of ML models at both training
and testing time has received lately a lot of attention. Initially,
adversarial attacks against supervised learning have been mostly
studied in the context of image classification systems [1]–[3].
But recently these attacks have been extended to other domains,
including cyber security [4] and speech recognition [5]. To
the best of our knowledge, though, adversarial attacks for
self-driving cars have not been addressed so far.
In this paper, we demonstrate that classification and regres-
sion models for self-driving car applications are also vulnerable
to adversarial evasion attacks at testing time. We consider the
case study of steering angle predicting from camera images,
using the dataset from the 2014 Udacity challenge 2 [6]. First,
we adapt the state-of-the-art Carlini and Wagner 2017 evasion
attack [7] to the classification problem of predicting steering
direction, using architectures inspired by two Convolutional
Neural Network (CNN) models that obtained good results in the
1Preprint of the work accepted for publication at the IEEE Workshop on
the Internet of Safe Things, San Francisco, CA, USA, May 23, 2019.
Udacity challenge [8], [9]. We show that minor modifications
to the camera image (an L2 distance of 0.82 for one of the
considered models) result in mis-classification of an image
to any class of attacker’s choice. Second, we design the first
testing-time attack for regression based on CNNs and test them
in the setting of this application. We show that our attacks
cause significant degradation to the Mean Square Error (MSE)
metric used to evaluate regression. In particular, our attack
increases the MSE of 10% of the images by a factor of more
than 20 compared to the setting without attack.
Our work calls for further research into the safety impli-
cations of these attacks in the self-driving car application
domain. As connected cars become more autonomous and new
technologies are developed for assisting drivers on the road, it
becomes of paramount importance to understand in depth the
security and safety of deep learning in this setting.
II. BACKGROUND AND THREAT MODEL
Background on connected cars. Modern cars are outfitted
with Electronic Control Units (ECUs) to control specific
functions on the car, such as the engine [10] and control-
ling brakes [11]. In connected cars, some of these ECUs
communicate outside of the car, such as for the infotainment
system, remote firmware patching, or on-board diagnostics [11].
While this adds functionality, it also opens them up to
attack. Furthermore, autonomous vehicles replace human-made
decisions with decisions made using sensor input from extra
cameras, LiDAR, RADAR, etc. These sensors communicate
with the control systems via their ECUs, over the CAN
bus. In a setting where ECUs have been compromised, lack
of authentication on the CAN bus makes it possible for a
compromised ECU to send messages as other sensors, such as
the camera.
Neural networks. A feed-forward neural network is a function
y = F (x) from input data points x ∈ Rn to output y ∈ Rm that
depends implicitly on model parameter θ. A neural network has
L layers, and the output F is computed by applying a function
at each layer. Each layer has a number of output neurons. In
each layer, a linear matrix multiplication is followed by a non-
linear activation function. For multi-class classification, the
last layer uses a softmax activation function with the number
of neurons equal to the number of classes. The inputs to
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the softmax function are called logits. We define F to be
the full neural network including the softmax function, and
Z(x) = z to be the output of all layers except the softmax,
thus y = F (x) = softmax(Z(x)).
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are a particular type
of feed-forward networks, with the requirement that at least
one of the layers performs a convolution operation followed
by a non-linear activation. A convolution is a linear operation
that slides a filter of small size over the output of the previous
layer and computes repeatedly dot products of the filter with
regions of the input data.
Udacity challenge. In the Udacity challenge 2 [6], the goal is
to predict the appropriate steering angle using only imagery
from the car’s center camera. A negative steering angle implies
turning left, while a positive one results in a right turn. The
full dataset consists of 33,608 images and their corresponding
steering angle values, in total 70GB of data.
Threat model. We consider an attacker who is capable
of controlling one or multiple ECUs. From here, lack of
authentication on the CAN bus can allow an adversary to spoof
messages from the camera [11]. The attacker can modify the
image sent by a camera, constructing an adversarial example
which will be misclassified by a steering angle controller for the
autonomous vehicle. We are concerned with an active attacker
with partial control of one or several car ECUs, interested in
generating a stealthy perturbation to images produced by the
camera. The reasons for which the attack wishes to remain
stealthy are multi-fold: (1) to avoid suspicion by humans
looking at the camera; (2) to avoid detection by anomaly
detection software for threat detection [12]. We consider the
strongest threat model (white-box attacks), which provides the
attacker full knowledge of the ML system.
Fig. 1: Scaled steering angle histogram
Statistic Value
Minimum -2.05
Maximum 1.9
Mean -0.008
Std. dev. 0.27
TABLE III: Scaled steering
angle distribution
Parameter Value
Learning rate 0.01
Momentum 0.9
Batch size 128
Epochs 50
TABLE IV: Training hyper-
parameters
Layer Architecture and Hyper-parameters
Convolutional + ReLU 32 filters of size 3× 3× 3
MaxPooling Filter 2× 2
Dropout Fraction 0.25
Convolutional + ReLU 64 filters of size 3× 3× 32
MaxPooling Filter 2× 2
Dropout Fraction 0.25
Convolutional + ReLU 128 filters of size 3× 3× 64
MaxPooling Filter 2× 2
Dropout Fraction 0.5
Fully-Connected + ReLU Neurons 1024
Dropout Fraction 0.5
Fully-Connected + Softmax Neurons 3
TABLE I: Epoch Model Architecture
Layer Architecture and Hyper-parameters
Batch Normalization Layer
Convolutional + ReLU 24 filters of size 5× 5× 3
Convolutional + ReLU 36 filters of size 5× 5× 24
Convolutional + ReLU 48 filters of size 5× 5× 36
Convolutional + ReLU 64 filters of size 3× 3× 48
Convolutional + ReLU 64 filters of size 3× 3× 64
Fully-Connected + ReLU Neurons 582
Fully-Connected + ReLU Neurons 100
Fully-Connected + ReLU Neurons 50
Fully-Connected + ReLU Neurons 10
Fully-Connected + Softmax Neurons 3
TABLE II: NVIDIA Model Architecture
III. ATTACK ALGORITHM
In this section we describe the evasion attack against DNNs
for steering angle prediction.
DNN architectures. A number of DNN models submitted to
the Udacity challenge 2 successfully predict steering angle
values, therefore solving the regression problem.
We first consider the classification problem of predicting
the car direction needed for predicting lane changes and
eventually the full vehicle trajectory [13]. Based on domain
expert recommendation, we select an angle threshold and
replace the exact value of the predicted angle with a class:
right if the steering angle exceeds the positive value of the
threshold; left if the steering angle is below the negative value
of the threshold; and straight otherwise. The car direction
prediction task takes as input the image camera and predicts
the direction the car should take. Second, we consider the
regression problem of predicting steering angles, identical to
the original challenge problem.
We select two Convolutional Neural Network models for
both the classification and regression problems. The first is the
Epoch model [8] (also used by DeepTest [14]), while the second
is inspired by Bojarski et al [9] (called NVIDIA model). The
Epoch model consists of 3 convolutional layers, and 2 fully-
connected layers (see Table I). The NVIDIA model has the
same number of convolutional layers and fully-connected layers
as Bojarski et al. [9], but less hidden units in the first fully-
connected layer to speed up training (see Table II). We adapted
both models for classification by adding a last layer with 3
hidden units and softmax activation function. The architecture
for regression is similar, excluding the last softmax layer. The
(a) Epoch model (b) NVIDIA model
Fig. 2: Success of attack with respect to distance
(a) Epoch model (b) NVIDIA model
Fig. 3: ROC curves for models with and without the attack.
NVIDIA model is more complex (467 million parameters)
compared to the Epoch model (25 million parameters).
Evasion attacks against direction classification. We use the
L2 distance between the original and adversarial image to
measure the amount of perturbation introduced by the attack.
In this setting, the attacker adds negligible perturbations to all
image pixels. We also assume that image pixels are normalized
in [0, 1]. We leverage and adapt the state-of-art L2 attack by
Carlini and Wagner [7], proposed originally in the context of
image classification. The attack crafts adversarial examples by
solving the following optimization problem for an image x
with original class i to find the perturbation σ that transforms
it into a targeted class t 6= i:
minimize ||σ||2 + c× f(x+ σ)
such that x+ σ ∈ [0, 1]d
f(x+ σ) = (max(Z(x+ σ)j 6=t)− Z(x+ σ)t)+
i - original class, t 6= i - adversarial target class.
Here s+ is the notation for max(s, 0), The main intuition is
that the optimization objective includes two terms: a distance
norm of the adversarial perturbation and a loss function that
is minimized when the modified image is classified to the
target class t 6= i. The hyper-parameter c controls the tradeoffs
between the amount of perturbation to the image and the attack
success of classifying to the target class.
Evasion attacks against steering angle regression predic-
tion. We are not aware of existing evasion attacks against
CNNs for regression. A regression model is typically evaluated
by the Mean Square Error (MSE) metric, defined either for
single points or over an entire dataset. MSE of a single point x
with response y ∈ R measures the squared residual (e.g.,
difference between the true response y and the predicted
response yˆ = F (x)). For a dataset, MSE is the average of the
squared residuals of all points. Our main insight is to adapt
the classification attack by changing the objective function to
maximize the MSE difference between the predicted response
on the adversarial image F (x+ σ) and the true response y.
This way, the attacker attempts to change the prediction on the
adversarial image further away from the true value.
Thus, in order to find the adversarial image for original
image x with response y, the attacker solves the following
optimization task with respect to the parameter σ:
minimize ||σ||2 − c× g(x+ σ, y)
such that x+ σ ∈ [0, 1]d
g(x+ σ, y) = (F (x+ σ)− y)2
Here c is a hyper-parameter that is found by binary
search; it controls the tradeoff between minimizing the image
(a) Input image, ’straight’ (b) Adversarial image, ’left’ (c) Adversarial image, ’right’
(d) Input image, ’left’ (e) Adversarial image, ’straight’ (f) Adversarial image, ’right’
(g) Input image, ’right’ (h) Adversarial image, ’straight’ (i) Adversarial image, ’left’
Fig. 4: Adversarial images for the Epoch classification model.
perturbation versus maximizing the MSE value. Small values
of parameter c should be used when the goal of making
the resulting perturbation negligible is more important than
increasing the MSE of the adversarial image.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
Data. The training data consists of 33,608 images extracted
from the videos provided by the Udacity self-driving car
challenge 2. We apply image preprocessing as done by previous
work [8], [14]: crop the images from the original size (640×480
pixels) to 640×280, and resize the images to 128×128 pixels.
Each datapoint includes the steering angle at the moment the
image was captured. The steering angles in the Udacity data
set driving log were pre-scaled by a factor of 1/25 (see the
histogram of the scaled angles in Figure 1 and statistics on the
distribution in Table III).
To assign classification labels, we split the scaled angle
values into 3 intervals to obtain the 3 directions (left, straight,
and right). The histogram, as well as discussion with domain
experts, motivates the choice of the scaled angle threshold at
0.15, resulting in majority of labels to be straight (70%), and
15% of labels to be set as left and right, respectively.
Training results. We train both models using 10-fold cross
validation. The accuracy for classification is high: 90% for the
Epoch model and 86% for the NVIDIA model. The hyper-
parameters for both models are in Table IV. While it is possible
to improve the accuracy of the NVIDIA model further by using
regularization and parameter tuning, we did not pursue this
direction as being an orthogonal goal to our paper’s main
focus. For the regression problem, we only report results for
the Epoch model, on which we obtain MSE of 0.03.
Attack results for direction prediction. For testing the attack
we choose 300 images from all 3 classes, and select the 2 values
of the targeted class (different from original class), resulting
in 600 adversarial images. We found the optimal value for
the attack hyper-parameter c by running binary search for 9
steps with the initial value of c equal to 0.001. As expected,
(a) Input image, ’straight’ (b) Adversarial image, ’left’ (c) Adversarial image, ’right’
(d) Input image, ’left’ (e) Adversarial image, ’straight’ (f) Adversarial image, ’right’
(g) Input image, ’right’ (h) Adversarial image, ’straight’ (i) Adversarial image, ’left’
Fig. 5: Adversarial images for the NVIDIA classification model.
if there are no constraints on adversary’s ability to manipulate
images, the adversarial success rate reaches 100%. Our goal is
to understand the minimum amount of L2 perturbation needed
for succeeding at generating adversarial examples.
The attacker success with respect to the amount of perturba-
tion is illustrated in Figures 2a and 2b. In the Epoch model,
a minimum modification to the image (0.82 L2 norm) results
in 100% attack success. However, the amount of perturbation
for NVIDIA is higher (121.01 L2 norm). We conjecture the
reason to be the additional complexity of the NVIDIA model,
resulting in a more robust architecture.
Finally, we study the impact of the attack on the models’
performance. The micro-average ROC curves with and without
the attack are in Figures 3a and 3b, respectively. False positive
rate for each class is the number of adversarial images classified
as this class. It could be easily seen that the model performance
decreases under attack (for instance, AUC decreases from 1 in
the no-attack scenario to 0.62 for 0.75 L2 norm perturbation
for the Epoch model).
In Figure 4 we show examples of original images (left), and
two corresponding adversarial images (center and right) for
the Epoch model. Similarly we show adversarial images for
the NVIDIA model in Figure 5. The images look very similar
to the original ones, but they become darker as the majority
of pixels incur minor modification (a result of our use of the
L2 distance). We thus demonstrate that we can modify images
from any source class to any targeted class. It took on average
around 5 and 25 seconds, respectively, to generate adversarial
image for the Epoch and NVIDIA models. This result confirms
that it takes longer to attack more complex models.
Attack results for steering angle prediction. For testing
the attack we choose 100 images. We found the optimal
value for the attack hyper-parameter c by binary search. As
expected, with higher values of c the attacker obtains adversarial
images with high MSE value. We found that the value of
hyperparameter c equal to 100 results in the most acceptable
tradeoff between MSE and amount of perturbation to the image.
In order to study the success of the attack, we calculate
Fig. 6: MSE CDF
Percentile MSE ratio Perturbation
10% 1.19 0.007
25% 1.38 0.02
50% 2.43 0.05
75% 6.31 0.29
90% 20.88 0.57
TABLE V: MSE ratio and L2 perturbation statistics
the statistics of L2 norm perturbation values and adversarial
to legitimate MSE ratio. These are illustrated in Table V. We
observe that 90% of adversarial images have perturbation value
less than 0.57 L2 norm, which is very small. Additionally, our
attack results in significant changes to the MSE of adversarial
images. In particular, 10% of adversarial images have an
MSE value more than 20 times higher than the MSE value
of the corresponding legitimate image. The maximum ratio of
adversarial to legitimate MSE is 69.
Finally, we study the decrease of the model’s performance
under adversarial attack. We plot the CDFs of the regression
model MSE with and without the attack in Figure 6. The
maximum MSE for the legitimate model is 0.002, while for
the adversarial model the maximum MSE reaches 0.014. We
show an example of a legitimate image that is transformed
into an adversarial image in Figure 7. The original steering
angle is −4.25 degrees, while the adversarial angle results in
a value of −2.25 degrees, a difference of 47.5%.
V. CONCLUSION
The existence of adversarial examples limits the areas in
which deep learning can be safely applied. We showed that
evasion attacks against neural networks are a real threat
for steering angle prediction in autonomous vehicles. With
small perturbation to the input images we created adversarial
examples that are either mis-classified by the model (in the
classification task) or increase the MSE of legitimate images
(in the regression task). Defending against these attacks is a
challenging open problem.
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